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EFRA Committee Agriculture Bill Inquiry 
This evidence is written by Dr Mary Dobbs from Queen’s University Belfast, Dr Ludivine Petetin 
from Cardiff University and Dr Viviane Gravey from Queen’s University Belfast. Both Mary 
Dobbs and Ludivine Petetin are Lecturers in Law with expertise in agri-environmental issues who 
have been engaging with stakeholders in Northern Ireland and Wales respectively on the impact 
of Brexit. They are currently writing a book on Brexit and Agriculture. Dr Viviane Gravey is a 
Lecturer in European Politics, co-chair of the ESRC-funded ‘Brexit & Environment’ academic 
network.  
 
Summary: 
 
This Agriculture Bill (AgBill) is the first step towards developing a post-Brexit agricultural policy 
for England and potentially the rest of the UK. It offers a huge opportunity to re-shape our rural 
economies and agricultural landscape – but also raises a number of challenges. This submission 
focuses on the following ones: 
- The removal of the Basic Payment Schemes (BPSs) is likely to significantly increase exits 
from agriculture. 
- The shift to ‘public money for public goods’, while welcome, is interpreted in a way that 
leaves major gaps including for rural development, food quality and healthy food. 
- The focus points for financial assistance in England and Wales highlight the potential for 
conflicting policies, competitive (dis)advantages between the four jurisdictions and a 
rudderless Northern Ireland. 
- The attention to cutting regulatory burdens raises questions about the depth of 
environmental commitments and the practicality of the policy (reducing inspections but 
creating massive information requirements). 
- The centralisation of power in London through the use of reserved trade powers imposes 
constraints on devolved policy-making on agriculture. 
 
Overall, the Agriculture Bill (AgBill) is a conflicted product of its time: centralised, adopting a 
‘one size fits all’ approach, yet not uniform and without relevant common frameworks; ambitious, 
but burdensome, patchy and unrealistic at times; and striving to be original and different from the 
EU and CAP, yet unable to break free entirely due to the continuing linkages and the role of WTO 
Law. The AgBill treats agriculture simply as another sector of the economy (apart from the public 
goods and rural development provisions – where relevant). It signals the end of agricultural 
exceptionalism. 
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I. Removal of Basic Payment Schemes 
  
(1) The AgBill proposes gradually to eliminate BPS in England and Wales and replace these with 
financial assistance linked to the provision of public goods – predominately ecosystem 
services. The transitional period ends in 2027 (Clause 5, and Schedule 3, Clause 5), but may 
be extended further. The AgBill does not determine the situation for the other devolved 
administrations, but they may follow suit perhaps due to trade policy and control of purse 
strings. 
 
(2) This is a major shift in agricultural policy – direct payments have been central to the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since the mid-1990s. With appropriate communication 
and a transitional period that enables farmers to adapt, the proposed focus on increased 
productivity and efficiency would allow farms – on average – to remain profitable after the 
abolition of CAP payments. The 50% of farmers in the middle are likely to succeed in moving 
away from direct payments to environmental payments as they become more profitable. The 
top 25% will barely feel the change in policy since they are already successful.  
 
(3) However, some farms that are currently struggling will find the change in the support system 
particularly difficult. Many UK farms are currently profitable solely because of CAP direct 
payments. It is likely that the bottom 25% of English farms that currently struggle or only 
survive because of the receipt of BPS will disappear.1  
 
(4) The impact of this radical change will be particularly severe in the devolved administrations 
compared to England, due to the nature of the farms and farming, the current financial support 
practices and their limited financial resources. As there are already caps in the other devolved 
regions (Gravey, Burns, & Jordan, 2016), large cuts in the current direct payments would be 
required to save money to re-route into new schemes and most farms will not survive any cuts.  
 
(5) Protecting small farms is important as they contribute in rural areas to the culture, society, 
economy (including directly through farming and tourism) and environment. Contrasting with 
CAP, a ‘level of farm income’ is not an objective of the AgBill or the consultation paper, which 
preceded it.2 Nevertheless the value of small farms was noted in the consultation paper in the 
context of uplands – with suggestions that they may merit further protection. From an 
environmental perspective, small farms or considerable variations and patchy farms are 
fundamental to the development and maintenance of biodiversity – including genetic diversity 
of crops and livestock – and thereby to agri-sustainability, environmental sustainability and 
food security on a national and global level. The simple basic management of a farm can be of 
considerable worth. Neither hill, uplands nor small farms are mentioned in the AgBill. The 
proposed public good in Health & Harmony “Preserving rural resilience and traditional 
                                                 
1 See comments made by Ludivine Petetin at the Game and Wildlife Conservation Trust All-Party Parliamentary 
Group in March 2018, https://www.gwct.org.uk/policy/appg/march-2018/; in the Farmers Guardian, 
https://www.fginsight.com/news/news/defra-makes-decision-to-let-quarter-of-uk-farms-disappear-57116; and in UK 
Business Insider; http://uk.businessinsider.com/quarter-english-farms-bankrupt-after-brexit-2018-4). 
2 Prof Alan Matthews, March 2018 http://capreform.eu/a-tale-of-two-policy-documents-defra-vs-commission-
communication/. 
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farming and landscapes in the uplands” did not make the cut.3 Whilst financial assistance is 
possible via other mechanisms, as discussed below, this will be challenging to access and their 
continued viability will be threatened. 
 
II. Public Money for (Some) Public Goods 
 
(6) Part of the current Green Brexit drive aims to modify the support that farmers receive for the 
farming activities they undertake. Although not express within the AgBill itself, it is apparent 
from the content, the accompanying Explanatory Notes and previous consultation document 
that the AgBill puts a strong focus on ‘public money for public goods’. The concept of ‘public 
goods’ is ambiguous and nebulous at best and the AgBill reflects a patchy and arguably narrow 
interpretation.  
   
(7) In Part 1, Clause 1, subsection 1 of the AgBill and in Schedule 3 for Wales we find seven 
headings relating to environmental protection – predominately enabling payments for 
ecosystem services. In conjunction with the subsequent Clauses, the AgBill has developed the 
necessary flexibility since the Consultation document to encompass both existing and new 
schemes, maintaining and improving environmental standards. 
 
(8) However, there are noticeable gaps here, including no mention of sustainability, biodiversity 
(including genetic diversity), or animals or creatures other than ‘livestock’. This is despite their 
significance for the environment, human health and indeed the long-term sustainability of 
agriculture. Care needs to be taken to avoid silo-ed or piecemeal approaches that do not 
reflect the nature of the environment, with permeable boundaries and the potential for an 
activity to pollute multiple environmental media or come from numerous sources. This is also 
amply demonstrated by the need for habitat protection, buffer zones and green corridors for 
migratory routes for instance.  
 
(9) Considering the focus on food production, there was ample opportunity to include healthy or 
high-quality food production, or food sovereignty for instance. There is a clear lack of focus 
on public health. Part 1, Clause 1, subsection 2 makes indirect reference to elements of food 
production, through the definition of ‘improving production’ that includes improving 
efficiency and improving the quality of products – an approach that is mirrored for Wales, but 
for both the support is tenuous and without a basis in an overarching food policy.4 These are 
valuable objectives and may become more significant in light of global pressures and the 
uncertainty as to the future trade relationship with the EU. 
 
(10) This lack of focus on food further impacts reflection on the whole food chain. Clause 25 
on fair dealing obligations oddly restricts requirements to the first purchaser of agricultural 
products. To deal with the issue of unfair trading practices, the whole of the food supply chain 
should be under the same requirements to aim at creating a certain balance between the 
different actors of the food chain. 
 
                                                 
3 DEFRA, Health & Harmony, p.35. 
4 See Prof Tim Lang’s post on the lack of vision for food in the AgBill 
https://greenallianceblog.org.uk/2018/09/18/the-new-agriculture-bill-has-no-vision-for-food/.  
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(11) A difference arises between England and Wales when it comes to rural development. For 
England, the sole mention of rural development – a key component in existing financing, via 
Pillar 2 of CAP – is through the potential to abolish, simplify or improve the existing payments. 
Clause 11 is intended to facilitate the remove of existing rural development payments and 
specifically not introduce new schemes related to rural policy. Pt. 112 of the Government’s 
Explanatory Notes indicates that new rural development schemes may be introduced under 
Clause 1 and financial assistance, but it does not exist as a new independent basis for financial 
assistance, as noted above. Yet, Schedule 3 provides for Wales to provide financial assistance 
to businesses or communities in rural areas under new schemes. Potential problems of 
competition between English and Welsh products could arise if Welsh products would be 
advantaged by such support (see further in next section). 
 
(12) Another gap includes administrative support, training and giving advice to farmers. 
Sufficient provisions on these matters would ease the transition for farmers to ensure the 
delivery of public goods.   
 
(13) Two key points need to be made here: (i) a wider range of valuable objectives should be 
included. The market will promote some and those outlined for England and Wales are 
important, but they should go further. (ii) Minimal standards for each public good (including 
the environment) should be required if the purposes are to be achieved and if the approach is 
not to be a façade – rather than leaving it to the Secretary of State/Welsh Ministers to impose 
conditions. 
 
 
III. A Missed Opportunity to Create a Fair System of Financial Support and Single UK 
Market  
 
(14) The AgBill enables considerable divergence across the four devolved jurisdictions. Part 1 
outlines the potential bases for financial assistance for England; Schedule 3, Part I enables 
Welsh ministers to do similarly, but with further provisions regarding rural support and 
supporting ‘persons’ involved in the production, processing or distribution of products deriving 
from an agricultural, horticultural or forestry activity’; Scotland is omitted entirely from this; 
and Northern Ireland has its own Schedule, but there is no legal basis for financial assistance. 
 
(15) The difference in treatment is clearly understandable in light of devolution and the political 
challenges on-going throughout the Brexit process. Agricultural support had been identified as 
likely to require a common UK legislative framework in March 2018.5 This AgBill is not it. 
This is an English Bill primarily, with the Welsh government having highlighted further 
elements that are significant to them in the form of rural support and supporting the people 
themselves – although, as noted the uplands is not included as a separate basis. The Scottish 
government has indicated its wish to develop its policies and is not amenable to English 
imposition. The Northern Irish Executive has been missing in action and whilst DAERA have 
                                                 
5 See the Cabinet Office Framework Analysis published in March 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686991/20180307_FINAL__Framew
orks_analysis_for_publication_on_9_March_2018.pdf. 
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undertaken an ‘engagement’ on their proposals developed in stakeholder meetings, they 
nonetheless have not the political authority to truly negotiate for NI or actively legislate (Dobbs 
et al., 2017). By omitting bases for financial assistance and not abolishing the existing payment 
schemes in NI (but enabling DAERA to modify these), the AgBill enables the eventual NI 
Executive to develop its own agricultural policy in accordance with devolution (within limits). 
 
(16) However, there are dangers associated with the differences in treatment. Firstly, the 
divergences enable valuable objectives to be excluded within some jurisdictions.  Secondly, 
farmers (and other land users) in one jurisdiction may receive a competitive advantage over 
farmers in the other jurisdictions – even where they live and work next to each other and sell 
into the same market. This is only emphasised and accelerated by the future lack of common 
frameworks for issues relevant to agricultural production at all stages, e.g. water quality, nature 
protection, and air pollution.6 Hence, there is, thirdly, the increased risk of a race to the bottom 
in order to (re)gain competitive advantages.  
 
(17) To summarise, (i) whilst implementation and the degree of relevance of the objectives may 
vary in practice across the devolved jurisdictions, the objectives are relevant to all four 
jurisdictions and should be available as a basis for payments for all four. This would necessitate 
a limited common framework for financial assistance and would help address some of the 
devolution issues noted below. (ii) Suitable financial support will be required from 
Westminster for the short or long-term continuation of direct payments and the injection of 
capital for new financial assistance schemes. 
 
IV. Cutting Regulatory Burdens? 
 
(18) One of the main objectives reflected in the AgBill is simplifying matters for farmers and 
cutting regulatory burdens. It is clear from the earlier Consultation document and implicit 
within the AgBill that the English government have decided to move away from CAP – 
including its greening criteria, cross-compliance requirements and inspections. The aims were 
primarily to simplify, cut regulatory burdens and avoid paying farmers twice for the same thing 
(environmentally friendly behaviour). This is worrying as, whilst there are significant flaws 
with CAP and its requirements, these could be addressed through developing and reforming 
the greening approach, rather than discarding it entirely – it seems to be very much a case of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
 
(19) However, the AgBill leaves open to the Secretary of State/Welsh Minister to introduce 
conditions to any financial assistance and make payments subject to compliance with these. 
Lessons should be learned from CAP and conditions should be imposed to require at least 
compliance with minimum standards for receipt of any payments. Again, the application of 
common frameworks here would support this and would ease the daily business of cross-border 
farms. Further, the UK White Paper on the Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union commits to the non-regression of environmental standards. However, 
no regulatory floor exists in the Bill. 
                                                 
6 See https://www.brexitenvironment.co.uk/2018/03/12/common-environmental-frameworks/. 
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(20) Appropriate compliance mechanisms are essential. Sufficient independent, expert 
monitoring and inspections are required to enable enforcing conditions (Brennan, 2016), which 
also require appropriate investment of resources. Potentially reducing inspections or 
monitoring, including through focusing on ‘risk-based’ inspections as suggested in the 
Delegated Powers Memorandum could undermine enforcement and thereby compliance. 
Further, the Secretary of State (SoS) appears to hold various enforcement powers. Where 
relevant, some of these powers should be delegated to the most appropriate body such as the 
Environment Agency or Natural England. 
 
(21) Implementation raises further concerns, as the new approaches will require a willingness 
to invest by farmers. The AgBill attempts to address this need through a gradual reduction in 
existing payments, a transitional period and a broad range of objectives underpinning the 
schemes. However, the details of the financial assistance schemes are not apparent, e.g. it is 
not clear at what point(s) the farmers/land users will receive the financing. Originally the 
Consultation document focussed on ‘outcomes’ – goals needed to be achieved to obtain 
financial support. Whilst the Explanatory Notes refer again to outcomes, the AgBill itself is 
loose on detail. This raises interconnected issues relating to legal certainty and effectiveness. 
 
(22) Firstly, outcome-based rewards obviously have their advantages. However, farmers may 
not risk investing if there is no guarantee of at least off-setting their costs. An alternative would 
be to provide some initial investment funds, instalments for steps/procedures, milestones and 
then eventual outcomes (as is proposed in the Welsh Consultation ‘Brexit and Our Land’). The 
AgBill has the potential to enable this, but it could be provided for expressly at this point. 
 
(23) Secondly, a related key issue for farmers highlighted regularly in Brexit discussions is the 
need for certainty – certainty regarding access to markets, regulatory standards and also 
financial support. Some investments may not have pay-offs on a short-term basis, but may only 
materialise in several years or decades. Farmers need to know how long financing will be 
guaranteed for and what objectives are priorities, in order to determine what investments are 
worthwhile and will guarantee financial reward. If the policy might change in the meantime, 
then there is no (economic) point in investing. CAP operated in 7-year cycles and even that 
could be considered too short. Hence, a group of Welsh farmers suggested a period of 30 years 
or longer for establishing a policy.7  
 
(24) In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that some farms may struggle more to make 
capital investments, may not be able to risk diversify through growing multiple crops/engaging 
in other economic activities and also may not be able to survive economically if they do not 
receive a regular income year-in, year-out (Gravey & Dobbs, 2018). In other words, once 
again, small, less-profitable farms will be worst hit if the schemes are not suitably tailored. The 
AgBill provides a quasi-fix, but it is self-defeating. Under Clause 7, delinked payments could 
be offered during the transition period. According to Pt. 90 in the Explanatory Notes, the 
                                                 
7 Jane Ricketts Hein, Eifiona Thomas Lane and Arfon Williams, The Future of the Welsh Uplands after the 
Common Agricultural Policy : Stakeholder Policy Priorities, May 2017, 
https://uplandsalliance.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/future-of-the-uplands-post-cap-report-final.pdf. 
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recipient of these payments will be under no requirement to farm the land. This could increase 
the amount of food imported into the UK, increase food insecurity and decrease UK self-
sufficiency. Conversely, delinked payments could enable farmers to deliver public goods 
without a focus on food production. 
 
(25) Part 3, Schedule 3 Part 3 and Schedule 4 Part 2 provide quite broad ranging obligations for 
the collection and sharing of data. These additional requirements on the actors of the food 
supply chain will not ease their day-to-day work and create a different kind of red tape – again 
more crippling for small farms.  
 
(26) Consequently, the proposals (i) potentially undermine mechanisms to enforce compliance 
with environmental and animal welfare standards, (ii) replace EU bureaucratic burdens with 
UK bureaucratic burdens and (iii) currently provide no long-term certainty for farmers as to 
whether they should invest or not.  
 
V. A Recentralisation of Powers in the Name of Trade 
 
(27) Part 7 addresses the need for the UK to guarantee that all schemes established across the 
four jurisdictions comply with WTO Law and in particular the Agreement on Agriculture’s 
(AoA) Amber, Green and Blue Boxes. In doing so, the Bill proposes effectively to curtail the 
devolved jurisdictions’ relevant powers. 
 
(28) The AoA is not as restrictive as is generally thought – there is some room in the agreement 
to design future schemes that will be compliant and thereby some leeway for the four 
jurisdictions to modify their respective support regimes post-Brexit to address regional and 
local needs.  
 
(29) The Amber Box comprises all domestic support measures considered to distort production 
and trade. Such measures typically must not exceed ‘de minimis’ support levels. ‘De minimis’ 
supports can be divided into two types of support: product-specific (5% of the total value of 
production of an agricultural product); and non-product specific (5% of the total agricultural 
production). However, some WTO Members (including the EU) can benefit from higher 
support than the de minimis level called the ‘Total Aggregate Measurement of Support’ 
(AMS). There is a strong argument for the UK to successfully negotiate the allocation of a 
portion of the EU Total AMS post-Brexit with EU member states and the WTO (Petetin, 2018). 
These ceilings limit the amount of spending for the UK and the devolved administrations under 
the Amber Box. 
 
(30) To qualify for the Green Box, the support must have no or minimal trade-distorting effects 
on production and programmes must comply with the basic and policy-specific criteria set out 
in Annex 2 of the AoA, relating to environmental and regional development for example. Blue 
Box support broadly relates to payments coupled with production but must reduce trade 
distortion. The AoA imposes no limits on Green and Blue Boxes spending by WTO countries 
– or therefore by each devolved jurisdiction. 
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(31) Consequently, there is considerable scope to develop compliant domestic support 
measures. 
 
(32) Clause 26 gives sweeping powers to the SoS to create regulations that recentralise the 
financial support for farmers and the design of support schemes across the UK. 
 
(33) This includes the potential for the SoS to (i) conclusively determine, the classification of 
financial support across the UK; (ii) set limits of spending for the whole of the UK; (iii) set 
individual ceilings of support across the devolved administrations; and (iv) create different 
ceilings across the devolved administrations.  
 
(34) Crucially, Clause 26(4)(b) gives powers to the SoS to fix the upper limits spent within 
each box by each devolved administration – despite WTO law not imposing any limits on 
Green or Blue box spending. 
 
(35) As the WTO Member, the UK is responsible for ensuring compliance. However, (i) Clause 
26 exceeds what is required; (ii) it effectively gives powers to the SoS that currently belong to 
the devolved administrations (using reserved powers on finance, trade and compliance with 
international agreements to trump the powers of the devolved administrations for agriculture); 
and (iii) although WTO mechanisms do not provide a forum for discussions or consultations 
with regions of a specific State, the UK may and should proactively engage the devolved 
administrations itself. As such, Clause 26 does not require a Legislative Consent Motion. This 
shift of powers from the devolved administrations to Westminster reflects the loss of the 
principle of subsidiarity present within EU law (for more on this point, please see Engel and 
Petetin, 2018). 
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